Practitioner Perspectives

Participatory Deliberative Democracy Mechanisms for Peacebuilding

Marcia D. Mundt Ph.D.[7]

Abstract: The liberal peace tradition, an approach to peacebuilding that proposes a combination of liberal democracy and marketization to stabilize peace after conflict (Chandler, 2010), has been the focus of a critical debate due to the horrific consequence of conflict relapse or escalation in the wake of failed interventions and a poor record of success (Call & Cook, 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Suhrke & Samset, 2007). As an alternative to the internationally and elite-led liberal peace, locally-led post-conflict peacebuilding has been proposed as an innovative solution (e.g. Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013). Participatory deliberative democracy (PDD) encourages public engagement in policy-making by emphasizing political inclusion and citizen empowerment through deliberation (Cini & Felicetti, 2018; Mundt, 2019). When applied in post-conflict contexts, it aligns with this 'local turn' by promoting 'hybridity' in peacebuilding practice (Mac Ginty, 2010). This paper summarizes the findings of a comparative, mixed methods study exploring how PDD has been implemented in two Central American post-conflict nations—El Salvador and Guatemala. It describes the divergent approaches to implementation in each country, the impacts of these mechanisms on peace, and lessons learned for future implementation.

[7] University of Massachusetts, Boston and the United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, Marcia.Mundt001@umb.edu, mmundt@usip.org

The Policy Problem: The Challenges of Building Peace

Improved peacebuilding and post-conflict development practices are a pressing concern across the global community. Since the introduction of the Marshall Plan following World War II, attempts to build peace in post-conflict contexts have been pursued largely by powerful states via bilateral aid or multilateral organizations. However, the nature of conflict today has changed. Walter (2011) indicates that over 90% of modern wars are intrastate versus interstate. Despite international efforts to promote durable peace, empirical research suggests that up to half of all civil wars begin within five years of a prior conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002). Conservative estimates suggest a post-conflict relapse rate of 23% (Suhrke & Samset, 2007). Even in countries touted as cases of successful peacebuilding, violence can increase far above wartime levels. In El Salvador and Guatemala, gang-related crime drove up the post-war homicide rate to a record high, which continues to be within the top ten world-wide at over 20 victims of intentional homicide per 100,000 population (UNODC Statistics, 2018). International interventions promoting durable peace have not succeeded in doing so.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, a growing debate about the values and strategies used to pursue peace has developed in academic and practitioner circles, between those that approach peacebuilding as a top-down liberal project, and those that support bottom-up local agency to consolidate peace. While leading proponents of the 'local turn' adopt a critical epistemology focused on power and poor people's liberation (Mac Ginty

& Richmond, 2013), peacebuilding actors have been quick to adopt the movement into the global peace and development agenda. Hughes et al. (2015) explain, "The complementarity between liberal approaches to economics and public administration and local-level action has underpinned a wave of development interventions going back to the 1970s, promoting microfinance, decentralisation, civil society associations, social capital, and social accountability" (p. 819). The New Deal for the Engagement of Fragile States (OECD, 2011) specifically calls for "country-led and country owned transitions out of fragility" (p. 1). Likewise, the US Global Fragility Act of 2019 calls for a strategy to "encourage and empower local and national actors to address the concerns of their citizens" and "address the long-term underlying causes of fragility and violence through participatory, locally led programs" (22 U.S.C. Ch. 105 §§ 9801-9810, pp. 1323-1324)

Exploring a Locally-Led Approach: Participatory Deliberative Democracy

PDD has been linked to improved political, social, and economic outcomes explored largely in international development or political science research (e.g. Blair, 2000; Boulding & Wampler, 2010; Osmani, 2001; Schneider, 1999; Wampler, 2012). Several scholars have written theoretically about how it may (or may not) apply in divided societies (e.g. Aragaki, 2009; Hancock, 2018; O'Flynn, 2017; Siu & Stanisevski, 2012; Ugarriza & Trujillo-Orrego, 2018). In Central America, the question of how and whether PDD can be applied in post-civil war contexts has been tested, as PDD has been used for over two decades as a means to engage the public in policy decision-making.

Two nations in particular—Guatemala and El Salvador—implemented PDD alongside their national peacebuilding processes and have not relapsed into civil war since signing their peace agreements in 1996 and 1992 respectively. Neither country pursued a 100% 'locally led' approach to peacebuilding, though both employed a 'hybrid' model involving international, national, and local actors. While both nations passed legislation calling for PDD just prior to, or as part of the peace process, the manner in which PDD was occasioned, implemented, and enforced differed greatly. In Guatemala, PDD implementation was characterized by a top-down approach supported by national-level policies to promote citizen participation, whereas El Salvador's PDD mechanisms were introduced from the bottom-up allowing for greater innovation within each municipality.

Methodology

Given the different ways that PDD was implemented and sustained in both of these nations, this study sought to answer two key questions: 1) In what ways did the implementation of PDD impact peace?; and 2) How did structural design and contextual factors in each country influence these effects? To address these questions, the study applied a multi-level integrated mixed methodology to a comparative case study of post conflict Guatemala and El Salvador. The three complementary levels of data collection and analysis included: 1) a macro-level historical and administrative review of PDD implementation, 2) a meso-level set of elite interviews with municipalities implementing PDD, and 3) a micro-level quantitative analysis of secondary public opinion data at two time-periods ten years apart and a set of PDD observations and participant interviews.

The semi-structured elite interviews lasted an average of 45 minutes. Municipalities were selected to balance urban-rural and indigenous-

ladino composition as well as political party affiliation of the administration. Representatives of eighteen and twenty-six municipalities were interviewed in Guatemala and El Salvador, respectively. The two-time-period quantitative analysis of internationally comparative public opinion survey data was triangulated with the results of the qualitative PDD process observations and semi-structured interviews averaging 30 minutes. At least one observation and participant interview site was selected from each quadrant of the municipality selection matrix, reaching fifty-eight participants in Guatemala and thirty-six participants in El Salvador. This multi-leveled approach strengthened the analysis of this complex issue and mitigated some of the challenges of each methodology by providing a validity check or design control at another level.[8]

Divergent Approaches: Top-down versus Bottom-up Mechanisms for Citizen Participation

In Guatemala, the introduction of participatory democracy was prescribed in the 1996 peace accords, and further supported by the 2002 Councils for Urban and Rural Development Act. Building upon traditional community improvement councils and indigenous community mayoral structures, the new Development Council system established deliberative forums scaling hierarchically from each neighborhood (COCODE) to municipal (COMUDE), regional (CODEDE), and national (CONADUR) levels as the primary PDD mechanism. Pre-existing venues for citizen participation were also re-initiated in the post-war era including open town hall meetings and public budget hearings. A consistent and enduring mechanism for citizen participation emerged through the interviews. Each municipality employed the same hierarchical structure with minor innovations to adapt to local context. PDD, in this case, was implemented from the top-down with funding pools earmarked specifically for projects proposed through the Development Councils, monitoring and reporting requirements at each level, and monetary incentives to ensure implementation.

In El Salvador, PDD developed through small-scale innovations by municipal officials and local and international non-governmental organizations. While decentralization of state power, government transparency, and citizen participation were propelled through peace process and gradually institutionalized in the Municipal Code (starting in the late 1980s before the peace agreement in 1992), PDD was not explicitly envisioned as a tool for peacebuilding. Each municipality and administration in succession developed its own approach to engaging citizens in public decision-making, supported by a 'winner take all' electoral formula, in which the party that won the mayoral seat controlled the composition of the Municipal Council as well (this changed in 2015). The most prominent PDD mechanisms used across municipalities were public assemblies and neighborhood Community Development Associations (ADESCOs), as well as various other mechanisms outlined in the Municipal Code. Interviews with officials revealed thirteen different PDD variations. In this case, PDD was developed from the bottom-up, and its implementation depended largely on the commitment and execution of independent municipal leadership.

[8] The author is grateful to the University of Massachusetts, Boston; the US Institute of Peace; and Fulbright-Hays for supporting this research.

Divergent Impacts: Multi-Dimensional versus Limited

Quantitative Results

To gauge the impacts of PDD, the quantitative analysis used data from the Americas Barometer, an internationally comparative dataset from a bi-annual survey coordinated by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. In 2008-2009, individuals in Central America were asked about their participation in three types of local PDD programs: community associations, open town hall meetings, and participatory budgeting and planning initiatives. The author petitioned LAPOP to re-apply this set of questions in 2018-2019, to enable a 10-year analysis of the long-term effects of citizen participation on peace. Galtung's (1969) typology of peace was used to operationalize four LAPOP survey questions as dependent variables to test the relationship between individual participation in PDD and individual-level 'positive peace,' defined as the "absence of structural violence," and 'negative peace' defined as "absence of personal [physical] *violence"* (Galtung, 1969, p. 183).

Galtung's (1969) typology is one of the most frequently utilized conceptualizations of peace in the field of conflict resolution, but there is no agreed-upon set of measures for these concepts. Lederach (1997, p. 75) suggests that key outcomes of peacebuilding include *sustainability* of peace and development, as well as a *transformation* of confrontation to dynamic, peaceful relationships. Sustainability is frequently measured by the durability of peace agreements without relapse into conflict, which has been explored quantitatively by scholars using datasets on war duration, battle deaths, and conflict termination (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000). Lederach (1997) explains that conflict party relationships across personal, relational, structural, and cultural dimensions signal progress toward transformation. Although 'peace' tends to be conceptualized and operationalized at the nation-state level using aggregated statistics such as conflict relapse termination (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000) or development level (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016), there is a growing recognition that peace is foremost experienced in the day-to-day realities of individuals (Mac Ginty, 2014; Mac Ginty & Firchow, 2016). Anderson (2004) acknowledges that peace cannot necessarily be measured in the same way at macro- to micro-levels of analysis, suggesting two conceptualizations of peace—violence and harmony—that mirror Galtung's typology and can be operationalized at multiple units of analysis.

Combining and building upon these approaches to measuring peace, the models in this study operationalized 'negative' peace with an individual-level measure for one's personal experience with violent crime. Likewise, 'positive' peace was operationalized across political, economic, and social dimensions using individual-level indicators for confidence in local government, perceived economic well-being, and neighbor trustworthiness.

The models controlled for community characteristics including urban versus rural setting, running water, and internet usage; individual demographics including age, education level, gender, race, religion, and news/media consumption; and theoretical mediators including political party, monthly income, and participation in other types of community groups. Logit or ordinal logit models were ran separately for each dependent variable; a summary of the model results is presented in Table 1 (Appendix), and full models are available upon request to the author.

Despite the continuing high level of crime and unrest in these two post-conflict Northern Triangle countries, the perceptions and experiences of PDD participants as compared to those that do not participate suggest that participation has a promising effect on individual-level positive peace in both countries, although in divergent ways.

In Guatemala, PDD took over two decades to show many effects on the various dimensions of peace. Indeed, at first, PDD was associated with adverse effects on negative peace, specifically an increase in PDD participant experiences with violent crime. This association disappeared after ten years, and participation became strongly associated with both political and social dimensions of positive peace. Participation in PDD increased over the decade between data collection rounds from forty-three to forty-six percent of the sample population. In El Salvador, PDD contributed positively to the political dimension of positive peace both at fifteen and twenty-five years following the civil war. Though disappearing over time, a weak association between PDD and perceptions of economic well-being also emerged in 2008/09. Similar to Guatemala, in the early years of implementation, El Salvador's PDD participants experienced increased incidences of violent crime compared to non-participants, but that effect diminished a decade later. Over time, participation decreased from thirty-three to thirty-one percent of the sample population. Interviews with participants comparing structural factors of PDD design and contextual factors stemming from the two nations' peace agreements and political climate after the wars elucidate the root causes of these divergent impacts.

Qualitative Results

In Guatemala, all but three PDD participants indicated that they felt a greater level of trust in local officials, because they were more involved, could exert some control over decision-making, and viewed PDD as a way of holding officials accountable.

Economically, participants saw the connection between PDD and community development outcomes as less direct. A lack of funding for development projects and long bureaucratic project implementation processes were cited by a third of participants and half of municipal officials as barriers to economic development.

Socially, participants shared inspiring stories about increased understanding and reconciliation across conflict parties, as well as improved community organization. PDD spaces, particularly the monthly COMUDE meetings, encouraged new relationships and alliances across traditional, and wartime, divides and between neighborhoods.

A few long-term participants noted tensions between representatives of the parties, together with conflicts, also between indigenous mayors and newly elected COCODE leaders in the early years of implementing the Development Council system. Municipal officials attributed the increased risks run by PDD participants to their heightened profile as community leaders and project proposals prioritizing security such as streetlight, camera, and gate installations. Despite these tensions and risks, participants overwhelmingly supported PDD for its valuable contribution to "something for everyone" through citizen participation, and nearly all felt a sense of satisfaction that "together we can achieve welfare and integral development."

The top-down nature of PDD implementation emerged as a key driver behind the long-term success of these policy initiatives. The Councils for Urban and Rural Development Act and the Municipal Code were referenced repeatedly as the

impetus of these developments, particularly via the hierarchical Development Councils. As one official noted, "Through all of the peace accords, the new laws, principally the law of the Development Councils, I have seen truly that communities are organizing, and we will not easily return to the 80s, the most conflictive time of the internal war." In one participant discussion, a COMUDE president brought a copy of both laws to the interview. He emphasized their importance, saying:

> Our existence is based in the Councils for Urban and Rural Development Act. It gives us the opportunity as citizens to participate in the development and well-being of our neighbors; it is in this we are based. And we also have the Municipal Code, in an article that gives us the freedom to organize as neighbors. […] Before that, we weren't taken into account, it wasn't permitted, we were not educated. Today, the people fight for their rights and participate more continuously, and they help with the development of their communities.

These findings from Guatemala make a compelling case for citizen participation models implemented from the top-down as integral to successful peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts.

In El Salvador, the statistical models indicated that PDD participants' trust in local government was higher than non-participants' across multiple points in time. However, just over half of participant interviewees reported that political favoritism was a barrier to their engagement, unlike in Guatemala where this dynamic was rarely reported. Indeed, political party affiliation was strongly associated with all three dimensions of positive peace in El Salvador's 2018/19 quantitative models. This incongruence between data sources prompted additional models controlling for political party alignment between the mayor and participants, confirming the robustness of the PDD-political dimension association despite party affiliation. Municipal officials and participants emphasized the importance of transparency over deliberation, through open Municipal Council and town hall meetings as the driving factor behind these results. Though political favoritism reportedly influenced allocation of community investment funds, PDD participants felt informed and therefore more likely to trust local officials.

Economically, a quarter of interviewees shared that PDD processes improved the overall community's development, but a lack of funding for the municipality inhibited investment.

Socially, only a few participants reported working across neighborhoods to achieve mutually beneficial goals. Within a neighborhood or village, however, around a third of participants reported that they made connections and built friendships with their neighbors in PDD forums.
Personal experiences of violence were noted in areas of high crime with depressingly vivid recall. In two cases, mayors reported being unable to enter certain neighborhoods due to gang rivalries. Participants provided three examples of violent threats resulting from their involvement in PDD processes. Despite these challenges, projects coordinated through PDD processes reportedly "changed lives" and "improved the quality of life" for participants and their communities and provided citizens with opportunities to prevent violence through PDD projects.

In El Salvador, PDD developed and propagated from the bottom-up, and though there were laws compelling municipalities to engage citizens in policymaking, it was largely up to the discretion of the local mayor to determine how. Likewise, funding for community development was filtered through municipal administrations without any requirement to adhere to a participatory or deliberative process. One ADESCO participant explained, "Honestly, here power is almost always political; political spaces and business spaces, so to speak, are the ones that take control of everything." A municipal official highlighted the limitations of PDD best, stating: "Citizen participation has always been important, the thing is that it depends on the mentality with which the official comes into office, right? If you want to do it in a participatory way or not, right?" Though El Salvador's version of PDD promoted greater innovation, it lacked accountability mechanisms and standardization across municipalities. This structure left PDD processes susceptible to political polarization and favoritism, which ultimately overpowered the voice and participation of the citizens.

Discussion

As these comparative findings indicate, Guatemala's PDD mechanisms emerge as better suited for peacebuilding than those employed in El Salvador because they encourage cross-community, intergroup contact and devolve greater control over decision making to participants and structural features that are associated with multiple dimensions of positive peace (political and social) over time. El Salvador's bottom-up approach has elicited a wide variety of experimental PDD mechanisms, but fewer institutionalized processes, incentives, or monitoring systems muted effects across all except for the political dimension of long-term peace. Each PDD system offers lessons about designing conflict-sensitive PDD structures and how post-conflict context influences implementation.

In both countries, PDD was one of many tools in a kit of hybrid peacebuilding approaches. While the approach to the implementation of PDD in Guatemala was top-down as compared to El Salvador's bottom-up model, neither country pursued peace or PDD in a purely local or liberal fashion.

Guatemala demonstrates the "compliance powers of the liberal peace" in which "promoters of the liberal peace are able to mobilize a formidable suite of compliance mechanisms to encourage conformity and to discipline attempts at deviance" (Mac Ginty, 2010 p. 398). The alternative approach in El Salvador could be classified as the "incentivizing powers of the liberal peace" (Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 400) at work whereby local administrations were incentivized, though not compelled, to support PDD implementation. Though both countries ultimately employed many principles of the liberal peace in the post-conflict era, PDD's unique and impactful contribution was its promotion of "the ability of local actors, structures, and networks to present and maintain alternative forms of peace and peacemaking" that "draw on traditional, indigenous, or customary norms and practices" (Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 403).

Limitations

Though this study's research design includes various levels of analysis and research methods to ensure a thorough investigation of PDD implementation and its impacts in Guatemala and El Salvador, the data presented still has its limitations. The quantitative data used is from a secondary source, so the variables selected for operationalization are not necessarily ideal

measures of the multiple dimensions of peace. Additionally, the data is cross-sectional, which limits interpretations to association versus causation and makes comparisons over time unfulfilling as compared to longitudinal data. The qualitative data is also limited by the timing of the fieldwork and access to locations and individuals in both countries. Interviews and observations were conducted over nine months divided over two years, and the majority of the data were collected during election season in both countries. Timing had influenced individual perspectives on PDD and its effects, as well as the discourse in PDD forums observed. Given that the study did not include every municipality across Guatemala and El Salvador, and extended observations were only possible in a handful of sites, it is possible that the trends and behaviors noted in the sample sites were not fully representative of all municipalities in these two countries. Thus, although the study introduces compelling evidence of the impacts of PDD in these two post-conflict countries, these findings should not be generalized, and interpretations should note these limitations.

Recommendations for Policy and Practice: Intentional Structure Adapted to Context

When considering the structure of PDD in post-conflict contexts, practitioners and policy-makers should be intentional about how the proposed mechanisms are designed and implemented. Generally, top-down implementation ensures consistency and allows for stronger monitoring and incentive systems, whereas a bottom-up approach allows for greater innovation. These cases highlight the following structural considerations and their implications for practice:

1. Sufficient funding for follow-through on community recommendations and priority projects is a pre-requisite for long-term citizen support;

2. Mechanisms should be designed to encourage cross-community collaboration to promote reconciliation;

3. Processes that empower citizens to make policy and budget decisions, rather than filtering decision-making through potentially partisan municipal administrations have more positive and multi-dimensional effects;

4. Building upon existing or traditional structures ensures the adoption and durability of new PDD mechanisms, though resultant shifts in power dynamics can create tension at first.

Context should also be considered before implementing post-conflict PDD: specifically, the extent to which broader participation is emphasized in the peace process, and whether post-conflict political systems reinforce conflict-party partisanship. Practitioners and policy-makers should reflect on the following lessons about how context influences PDD implementation:

1. Intentionally integrating participation in the peace agreement and process can strengthen PDD adoption and outcomes;

2. The long-term impacts of power-sharing can be detrimental to participatory processes by fortifying war-era political partisanship;

3. Political structures that encourage cross-conflict-party deliberation are vital for ensuring that all citizens have an opportunity to be heard; and

4. Violent crime may heighten the risk of PDD participation, while also acting as a catalyst for

community engagement, emphasizing the need for 'do no harm' and risk mitigation strategies.

Upon comparing PDD mechanisms used in post-conflict Guatemala and El Salvador, the structure and context in the former case have had more success than the latter in helping to advance multiple dimensions of peace over time. However, this does not mean that Guatemala's system should be duplicated in every post-conflict context. The structure of PDD must be designed in each case to respond to the context, and it must be acknowledged that short-term impacts are likely to be detrimental to 'negative' peace even if they support 'positive' peace in the long run.

References

Anderson, R. (2004). A Definition of Peace. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, *10*(2), 101–116.

Aragaki, H. (2009). Deliberative Democracy as Dispute Resolution? Conflict, Interests, and Reasons. *Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution*, *24*(3), 407–480.

Blair, H. (2000). Participation and accountability at the periphery: Democratic local governance in six countries. *World Development*, *28*(1), 21–39.

Boulding, C., & Wampler, B. (2010). Voice, votes, and resources: Evaluating the effect of participatory democracy on well-being. *World Development*, *38*(1), 125–135.

Call, C. T., & Cook, S. E. (2003). On democratization and peacebuilding. *Global Governance*, *9*(2), 233–246.

Chandler, D. (2010). The uncritical critique of 'liberal peace.' *Review of International Studies*, *36*, 137–155.

Cini, L., & Felicetti, A. (2018). Participatory deliberative democracy: toward a new standard for assessing democracy? some insights into the Italian case. *Contemporary Italian Politics*, *10*(2), 151–169.

Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2002). Aid, Policy and Peace: Reducing the risks of civil conflict. *Defence and Peace Economics*, *13*(6), 435–450.

Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2000). International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis. *The American Political Science Review*, *94*(4), 779–801.

Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, Peace, and Peace Research. *Journal of Peace Research*, *6*(3), 167–191.

Global Fragility Act of 2019, 22 U.S.C. Ch. 105 §§ 9801-9810 (2019).

Hancock, L. E. (2018). Legitimate agents of peacebuilding: Deliberative governance in zones of peace. *Local Peacebuilding and Legitimacy: Interactions between National and Local Levels*, 20–42.

Hughes, C., Öjendal, J., & Schierenbeck, I. (2015). The struggle versus the song – the local turn in peacebuilding: an introduction. *Third World Quarterly*, *36*(5), 817–824.

Institute for Economics and Peace. (2016). *Positive Peace Report*. Sydney, Australia.

Latin American Public Opinion Project. (2009). *The AmericasBarometer (El Salvador and Guatemala).* [Data sets, survey questionnaires, and code books]. Retrieved from www.lapopsurveys.org

Latin American Public Opinion Project. (2019). *The AmericasBarometer (El Salvador and Guatemala).* [Data sets, survey questionnaires, and code books]. Retrieved from www.lapopsurveys.org

Lederach, J. P. (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace.

Mac Ginty, R. (2010). Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and

Bottom-Up Peace. *Security Dialogue*, *41*(4), 391–412.

Mac Ginty, R. (2014). Everyday Peace: Bottom-up and Local Agency in Conflict-affected Societies. *Security Dialogue*, *45*(6), 548–564.

Mac Ginty, R., & Firchow, P. (2016). Top-down and bottom-up narratives of peace and conflict. *Politics*, *36*(3), 308–323.

Mac Ginty, R., & Richmond, O. P. (2013). The Local Turn in Peace Building: a critical agenda for peace. *Third World Quarterly*, *34*(5), 763–783.

Mundt, M. D. (2019). *Participatory Deliberative Democracy for Peace in El Salvador*. *Journal of Public Deliberation* (Vol. 15).

O'Flynn, I. (2017). Pulling Together: Shared Intentions, Deliberative Democracy and Deeply Divided Societies. *British Journal of Political Science*, *47*(1), 187–202.

OECD. (2011). A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. In *International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.* Busan, Korea.

Osmani, S. R. (2001). Participatory Governance and Poverty Reduction. In A. Grinspun (Ed.), *Choices for the Poor: Lessons from National Poverty Strategies* (pp. 121–143). New York, NY: United Nations Development Program.

Schneider, H. (1999). Participatory governance for poverty reduction. *Journal of International Development*, *11*(4), 521–534.

Siu, A., & Stanisevski, D. (2012). Deliberation in Multicultural Societies. In T. Nabatchi, J. Gastil, G. M. Weiksner, & M. Leighninger (Eds.), *Democracy in Motion: Evaluating the Practice and Impact of Deliberative Civic Engagement* (pp. 83–102). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Suhrke, A., & Samset, I. (2007). What's in a Figure? Estimating Recurrence of Civil War. *International Peacekeeping*, *14*(2), 195–203.

Ugarriza, J. E., & Trujillo-Orrego, N. (2018). The ironic effect of deliberation: what we can (and cannot) expect in deeply divided societies. *Acta Politica*.

UNODC Statistics. (2018). *Intentional homicide, counts and rates per 100,000 population*. Vienna, Austria.

Walter, B. F. (2011). Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Peace. *World Bank*, 1–41.

Wampler, B. (2012). Participatory Budgeting: Core principles and Key Impacts. *Journal of Public Deliberation*, *8*(2), Article.

Appendix

Table 1: Comparative Model Results for Guatemala and El Salvador

Independent		Dependent	Positive Peace (Political)- trust in municipal government	Positive Peace (Economic)- perception of economy	Positive Peace (Social)- trust of others in the neighborhood	Negative Peace (Overall)- personal experience of violence
Guatemala	2008/09	PDD Participation	1.05 (.132)	1.02 (.142)	1.33 (.169)**	1.38 (.254)***
	2018/19		1.61 (.183)*	1.08 (.143)	1.37 (.157)*	1.22 (.191)
El Salvador	2008/09		1.47 (.164)*	.785 (.115)***	1.00 (.116)	1.34 (.221)***
	2018/19		1.61 (.202)*	1.21 (.175)	1.18 (.155)	1.10 (.188)

*p<.01, **p<.05, ***p<.10